

### Possible Implications of the Ostracism of Hyperbolus

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The ostracism of Hyperbolus is one of those puzzling minor events in Greek history which upon closer examination take on added importance.<sup>1</sup> The event in itself is not as significant as the implications it has for our understanding of Athenian internal politics during the latter stages of the Peace of Nicias. The intent of the present article is to support the date 416 for the ostracism, and I hope to show that the actions of Nicias and Alcibiades in the period from the battle of Mantinea to the debate over the Sicilian expedition become clearer if the date of the ostracism is placed in 416.

Apart from the three accounts of the ostracism in Plutarch, most of our information about Hyperbolus comes from the comic poets and their scholiasts. For the most part these references show only that Hyperbolus was the butt of standard jokes directed against demagogues and are inconclusive with respect to the main problem dealt with in this article.<sup>2</sup> Hyperbolus was the son of Antiphanes<sup>3</sup> and belonged to the deme Perithoidae.<sup>4</sup> As Carcopino and Ehrenberg among many others have pointed out,

<sup>1</sup> A version of this paper was read before the American Philological Association on December 29, 1962. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the readers to whom I have shown it for their many valuable comments and suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> For summaries and analyses of the evidence see Swoboda, *RE* 9 (1916) 254–58, s.v. "Hyperbolos," and F. Camon, "Figura e ambiente di Iperbolo," *RSC* 4 (1961) 182–97.

<sup>3</sup> This name was confirmed in 1938 by the discovery of an ostrakon reading *ΥΠΕΡΒΟΛΟΣ / ΑΝΤΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ*. This is in accord with the information preserved in Androtion, Fr. 48 = Schol. Luc. *Tim.* 90, 114 Rabe, and thus is to be preferred over Theopompus Fr. 95 and Schol. Ar. *Pax* 681, which give the name Chremes. On the discovery of the ostrakon see T. Leslie Shear, "The Campaign of 1938," *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 246, and for the importance of the confirmation of Androtion see H. Bloch, "Historical Literature of the Fourth Century," *HSCP*, Suppl. 1 (1940) 354–55. A. E. Raubitschek, "Theopompus on Hyperbolos," *Phoenix* 9 (1955) 122–26, discusses the significance of the different names for Hyperbolus' father and the influence of Theopompus' treatment on the general tradition.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 13, *Nicias* 11.

he was a representative of the new type of political leader that arose in the latter part of the fifth century from the middle or mercantile class.<sup>5</sup> About his public life, however, little is known. He succeeded Cleon as the leading demagogue (Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 624, *Pax* 681, *Eq.* 149, 1304), but to what extent he either followed or endorsed Cleon's policies, both foreign and domestic, is not known. Hyperbolus' name appears on two inscriptions, *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 84 and 95. In the first it is a sure restoration (line 5), but the contents of the inscription deal with the worship of Hephaestus and thus are not informative about Hyperbolus' public life. The second inscription, to which I shall return shortly, records an amendment of Hyperbolus to another decree where he apparently proposed an audit of the *prytaneis* in an earlier prytany.

The ostracism is usually interpreted as resulting from the power struggle between Nicias and Alcibiades after the battle of Mantinea.<sup>6</sup> The traditional date of this event, 417, is arrived at by the combination of two pieces of evidence. The first is Thucydides' only reference to Hyperbolus. This passage (8.73.3; cf. 8.21, 8.63.3) describes Hyperbolus' death on Samos at the hands of the Samian democrats turned oligarchs, who threw his body into the sea as a pledge of good faith between the two oligarchic factions. The balanced phrasing of the historian's appraisal of Hyperbolus clearly influenced Plutarch and the scholiasts to Aristophanes (e.g. Schol. Ar. *Pax* 681).<sup>7</sup> The evidence from Thucydides and Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 32.1 dates his death with certainty to May/June 411.

The second piece of evidence is Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F96b (hereafter 96b), which is as follows:

ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξ ἔτη· ὁ δὲ καταπλεύσας εἰς Σάμον καὶ τὴν οἰκησιν αὐτοῦ ποιησάμενος ἀπέθανε, καὶ τούτου τὸν νεκρὸν εἰς ἄσκὸν ἀγαγόντες εἰς τὸ πέλαγος κατεπόντωσαν.

The crucial phrase is ἐξ ἔτη. No support can be found for the view that it means that the term of the ostracism was to be six

<sup>5</sup> J. Carcopino, *L'ostracisme Athénien*<sup>2</sup> (Paris 1935), V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*<sup>3</sup> (New York 1962).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 339–40; N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* (Oxford 1959) 387; and H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> (Munich 1960) 232.

<sup>7</sup> Raubitschek (above, note 3) 123, holds that we possess in this scholium "a faithful summary, if not a quotation, of Theopompus' treatment of Hyperbolus."

years. There is little reason to suppose that the term was ever reduced, and so the assumption must be made that Hyperbolus was ostracized for the traditional decennium. As Woodhead observes,<sup>8</sup> Philochorus' statement (*FGrH* 328 F30) that the term of ostracism was at first ten years but was later reduced to five may have stemmed from the tradition that Cimon returned to Athens immediately after the battle of Tanagra. The ἐξ ἑτη must then refer to the actual period that Hyperbolus spent in exile and since the date of his death is known Theopompus seems to date the ostracism to 417.<sup>9</sup>

This combination of the evidence from Thucydides and Theopompus was not generally questioned until Woodhead's reconstruction of *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 95, which has recently been supported by the similar investigations of McGregor.<sup>10</sup> Both scholars interpret the inscription to mean that Hyperbolus proposed an amendment to a decree in the *tenth* prytany of the year 418/17. Hyperbolus consequently could not have been ostracized in the early spring of 417, since ostracism proceedings were begun in the sixth prytany and completed before the elections of generals in the

<sup>8</sup> A. G. Woodhead, "*IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 95 and the Ostracism of Hyperbolus," *Hesperia* 18 (1949) 83.

<sup>9</sup> Raubitschek (above, note 3) 125–26, and H. Neumann, "Die Politik Athens nach dem Nikiasfrieden und die Datierung des Ostrakismos Hyperbolos," *Klio* 29 (1936) 37, see a grammatical difficulty in the first clause of the Theopompus fr., ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξ ἑτη, and Raubitschek has proposed the following supplements: ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξ ἑτη <δημαγωγήσαντα vel πρωτεύσαντα vel προστάntα αὐτῶν>. Raubitschek rejects C. G. Cobet's (*Observationes criticae in Platonis comici reliquias* [Amsterdam 1840] 143) rendering of the clause, "ostracismo eiecerunt hominem, in quo exilio sex annos vixit," and makes the following comment about the un-emended statement: "The Greek means 'they ostracized Hyperbolos (for) six years' which does not make sense—the sentence of ostracism was for a ten year period. Cobet's Latin version makes sense but it is not a translation of the Greek" (125, note 6). It is correct to point out that ἐξ ἑτη cannot refer to the specified term for Hyperbolus' exile, but this does not mean that "they ostracized Hyperbolos (for) six years" does not make sense. If we consider that the fragment, introduced by the scholiast's γράφων ὅτι, is out of context, the baldness of the first clause does not require emendation, and the ἐξ ἑτη may be interpreted, as by Cobet and others, to mean that Hyperbolus lived in exile for six years. The seeming grammatical difficulty of the first clause comes from the ambiguity of both the Greek ἐξ ἑτη and the English "(for) six years," but it may be clarified somewhat if the clause is translated, "they had ostracized Hyperbolos six years." On the translation of the aorist in this manner see W. W. Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses* (Boston 1890) 18. See also the remarks of Beloch (above, note 6) 339.

<sup>10</sup> Woodhead (above, note 8) and M. F. McGregor, "The Genius of Alkibiades," *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 43–46.

seventh or eighth prytany (cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.5, Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F30). If this evidence is accepted, the earliest that Hyperbolus could have been ostracized was the spring of 416.

Although McGregor admits that both his and Woodhead's treatments of *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 95 involve conjecture, the cumulative evidence that they adduce is strong and should be accepted.<sup>11</sup> The inscriptional evidence need not contradict that of Theopompus 96b; for it may be assumed that the figure ἐξ ἑτη counts by means of inclusive reckoning of archon years starting with 417/16 and ending with 412/11.<sup>12</sup> There is no difficulty in assuming that Theopompus used inclusive reckoning in this fashion, and thus this combination of the available evidence implies that the ostracism did in fact take place in 416.

The other possible date for the ostracism, 415, has been proposed by Raubitschek, who bases his position on the contents of [Andocides] 4 and sees a strong connection between the ostracism and the events that preceded the Sicilian expedition.<sup>13</sup> I would

<sup>11</sup> Both Woodhead and McGregor present excellent arguments for the new dating of *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 95, which does not depend solely on the restoration of ἐπὶ Ἀντιφ[όντος ἀρχοντος] in line 12, as C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952) 395–6, apparently assumed. For, in addition, there are references to the two prytanising tribes, Aiantis and Aegeis, and it has been definitely shown from *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 94 that Aegeis held the tenth prytany of 418/17. Since the order of prytanies was determined by lot, only in the ninth could the tenth be known by elimination. The time limits set in the inscription indicate that the matter was pressing, and it may be assumed that the audit (?) under consideration in *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 95 was to be completed before the end of the cycle of prytanies. The only other tenth prytany known by name in this period is for 417/16 when it was Antiochis during the eponymous archonship of Euphemus (cf. *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 302). Since we know that Antiphon was eponymous archon in 418/17, the restoration of his name is fairly certain in line 12 when we consider the evidence of the two prytanising tribes and *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 94. Hignett seized upon Woodhead's admission that the restoration of *IG* 1<sup>2</sup> 95 is "highly conjectural," but most of the conjecture surrounds the nature of the amendment Hyperbolus proposed and not the dating of the action to the tenth prytany of 418/17.

<sup>12</sup> This possibility is admitted by both Woodhead (above, note 8) 83 and McGregor (above, note 10) 46, note 5.

<sup>13</sup> A. E. Raubitschek, "The Case against Alcibiades (Andocides IV)," *TAPA* 79 (1948) 191–210. Cf. 208: "We are not primarily concerned here with examining this agreement between Alcibiades and Nicias which resulted not only in the ostracism of Hyperbolus but also in the election as generals of both Nicias and Alcibiades, and in their joint preparation of the Sicilian Expedition. It is clear, however, that the juxtaposition of the ostracism of Hyperbolus and the Sicilian Expedition adds considerably to our understanding of Athenian policy at that time. It also relieves Thucydides from the charge of having completely ignored the ostracism of Hyperbolus. For what really mattered was not the disappearance of this popular demagogue but the peculiar

now like to examine this view together with the evidence from the three accounts of Plutarch.<sup>14</sup>

In *Aristides* 7 Plutarch contrasts the ostracism of Hyperbolus with that of Aristides. Since he gives the same motivation and resulting degradation of the institution as in *Nicias* 11, it may be inferred that the *Aristides* account is a synoptic version used as an illustration. The principal version is found in the life of Nicias immediately following the description of the Quadruple Alliance of 420 and preceding the embassy from Egesta and Leontini in 415. Plutarch describes the ostracism as resulting from the feud of Nicias and Alcibiades. Plutarch offers the same oversimplified dichotomy between the older generation that desires peace and the younger one that wants war which is found in Nicias' speech against the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.13.1). The motivation of the populace in desiring the ostracism is equally simplified, and Plutarch describes Alcibiades as being feared because of his wealth, his withdrawn, foreign way of life, and because he had forced the people to do the right thing against their will. It is important to notice that Plutarch in no way depicts the struggle as a direct result of the events of the preceding year. Hyperbolus' part in the political struggle, however, is given a very precise motivation (*Nic.* 11.4). He proposed the ostracism to eliminate either Nicias or Alcibiades from the political scene so that he might more successfully oppose the other.

After the death of Cleon, Hyperbolus wished to assure his status as *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* (cf. Ar. *Pax* 681–84) and to use this position as a stepping stone to the generalship, but the carefully calculated, however flamboyant, policies of Alcibiades blocked this move.<sup>15</sup> There can be little doubt that a conflict between Hyperbolus and Alcibiades developed after Cleon's death which

association and disagreement between the two leading military men, Nicias and Alcibiades. This complex situation, however, was very cleverly described by Thucydides in the prologue to the Sicilian Expedition itself (6.8–26)."

<sup>14</sup> For a detailed list of the variants in all three accounts see Carcopino (above, note 5) 195–215. Raubitschek (above, note 3) 122–23, also draws attention to the results of C. Stoltz in *Zur relativen Chronologie der Parallelbiographien des Plutarch* (Lund-Leipzig 1929) about the order of composition which is most likely: *Aristides*, *Nicias*, *Alcibiades*.

<sup>15</sup> I agree with McGregor's thesis ([above, note 10] 27): "... at all stages of his career Alcibiades knew exactly what he was doing and did it with deliberation, that he possessed an uncanny, as well as lucky, ability to forecast what would happen under given circumstances, that he was rather a shrewd gambler than mere opportunist."

could only be resolved to Hyperbolus' satisfaction by the removal of Alcibiades.<sup>16</sup> Although Alcibiades had a strong popular following, he was always liable to charges of aspiring to tyranny (Thuc. 6.15.4). As heir to Cleon, Hyperbolus would be opposed to Nicias, and the demagogue's desire for conquest in the West shows a basic difference between their foreign policies.<sup>17</sup> Hyperbolus raised the same threat to Nicias as Cleon had in the preceding decade, and there can be little doubt that Nicias must consequently have viewed Hyperbolus' aspirations to power with some apprehension. Thus Hyperbolus was at odds with both major political figures of the period, and the extent to which he would gain by the removal of either becomes evident. The eclipse of Alcibiades would open the most immediate route to power for Hyperbolus and would assure him the leadership of that nebulous group often called the "radical democrats." Once he was in this position, he would be able to follow the pattern of Cleon's career as *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*.

The immediate advantages of the removal of Nicias for Hyperbolus are also easy to grasp. If Nicias had been ostracized, a major realignment of Athenian policies, politics, and politicians would have occurred. Nicias had enjoyed remarkable success for the past five years. His removal, albeit highly unlikely, from the political scene would have caused a distinct "power vacuum." This imbalance would have resulted from the character of Athenian politics as much as from the loss of the individual leader. Although it is convenient to speak of factions and parties, the use of these terms can be misleading since in Athenian politics of the period there were no formal political parties in the sense that we understand the term today. The dominant factor was the individual statesman about and under whose direction both policies and their implementation coalesced. There can be little doubt that Alcibiades would have welcomed broader based political support and also that he found his association with the "radical" elements uncomfortable at times (cf. the expressions of

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Neumann (above, note 9) 41-43.

<sup>17</sup> Hyperbolus' military aspirations were satirized as early as the *Equites* (1300-1304) where one of the triremes horrifies the others by saying that Hyperbolus wishes to lead an expedition of 100 ships to Carthage. There is a certain amount of fancy in this remark, but there is also a certain historical core in it, reflecting Athenian imperialistic designs on the West which later were to be associated so closely with the policy of Alcibiades. On this point see J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*<sup>2</sup> (Paris 1951) 144.

his pique in Thuc. 6.89, 92). Should Nicias have been forced to withdraw, Alcibiades might well have paused to gain additional support from the conservatives and so gain control of the ecclesia. If so, time would be gained by this action which would allow Hyperbolus to get control over the radical groups.

It is known from Plutarch (*Alc.* 13.4) that Hyperbolus did propose the ostracism, and in the life of Nicias we see that both major factions combined to turn the ostracism away from their leaders: καὶ τὰς στάσεις συναγαγόντες εἰς ἓν ἀμφοτέρας καὶ ἀναμίξαντες, ἐκράτησαν ὥστε μηδέτερον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἐξοστρακισθῆναι (*Nic.* 11.4). The necessity for unity to avert the danger posed by the ostracism was met by the two opposing factions, apparently with some ease, and their coalition gave them the needed votes to ostracize Hyperbolus instead. This coalition is another demonstration of how Alcibiades needed at least some support from the conservatives to implement his foreign policy. The conservatives, however, may have had another leader available in Phaeax. Plutarch in the life of Nicias concludes in this fashion: "I am well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracized when Phaeax and not Nicias was striving against Alcibiades, but most writers state the case as I have done."

In this connection we must examine the account of the ostracism in Plutarch's *Alcibiades*. As is the case in his life of Nicias, the narrative leaves the chronological position of the ostracism vague. It follows the story of Alcibiades' victory at Olympia and precedes the political events of 418 and the battle of Mantinea. The relevant sections in *Alcibiades* begin with a description of the rapid political rise of Alcibiades, who soon eclipses all the political leaders except Nicias and Phaeax, who is described as being at the start of his political career (13.1-2). In this account Plutarch places more emphasis on the version of Theophrastus and depicts Phaeax, Nicias, and Alcibiades as each fearing that the ostracism will fall on him, but Plutarch does not follow Theophrastus in stating that it was the union of Alcibiades and Phaeax that caused the ostracism of Hyperbolus.<sup>18</sup> As McGregor observes, the account of the actual ostracism in *Alcibiades* implies

<sup>18</sup> For Plutarch's sources see Raubitschek's precise summary (above, note 3) 122, note 2, and Bloch (above, note 3) 357-61.

that Alcibiades took his usual initiative in turning the proceedings against Hyperbolus.<sup>19</sup>

The introduction of this three-way contest for power among Nicias, Alcibiades, and Phaeax further complicates the problems surrounding the ostracism. Carcopino and Raubitschek agree that Plutarch's description of the political situation stems from the account of Theophrastus, but they differ in their interpretation of Phaeax's role.<sup>20</sup> In Plutarch (*Alc.* 13.2) there is the following statement: *φέρεται δὲ καὶ λόγος τις κατ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Φαίακος γεγραμμένος*;<sup>21</sup> and we also possess [Andocides] 4, a speech directed against Alcibiades by an unnamed speaker on the occasion of an impending ostracism when Nicias, Alcibiades, and the speaker are considered the most likely victims. Now if we connect these two pieces of information and accept Raubitschek's emendation of *Alc.* 13.2 (above, note 21), the speaker is Phaeax. The reference in the speech to the fall of Melos (22) indicates that the dramatic date of the speech is after this event. Since Melos capitulated in the winter of 416/15 (Thuc. 5.116), [Andocides] 4 places the ostracism of Hyperbolus in 415, the evidence of Theopompus 96b notwithstanding.

It is highly improbable that the speaker is Andocides, since the speaker boasts of having served on six embassies, one of them to Sicily (41), and Andocides makes no reference to these accomplishments in either the *De Reditu* or *De Mysteriis*. Phaeax, however, is known to have headed the inconclusive embassy to Sicily in 423/22 (Thuc. 5.4–5). The speaker mentions that he has been acquitted four times on capital charges and Phaeax is known to have been acquitted on at least one occasion (Ar. *Eq.* 1375–80 *et schol. ad loc.*).

Our knowledge of Phaeax's activities, like those of Hyperbolus, is in itself very limited. Plutarch (*Alc.* 13.1) states that Phaeax was of noble birth. The characterization of Phaeax's manner of

<sup>19</sup> McGregor (above, note 10) 32, note 13; cf. *Alc.* 13.4: *συνήγαγε τὰς στάσεις εἰς ταῦτόν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν κατὰ τοῦ Ὑπερβόλου τὴν ὁστρακοφορίαν ἔτρεψεν*.

<sup>20</sup> Carcopino (above, note 5) 195–215, Raubitschek (above, note 13) 207–10.

<sup>21</sup> On the emendation of the second *καὶ* to *ὑπό* first made by Xylander see the different views expressed by Carcopino (above, note 5) 210–11 and Raubitschek (above, note 13) 210. Carcopino follows Meier's emendation to *ὡς* and translates the phrase "attribué à Phaeax." Raubitschek believes that the original phrase was *φέρεται δὲ καὶ Φαίακος λόγος τις κατ' Ἀλκιβιάδου γεγραμμένος*.



speech in *Alcibiades* 13.2 is in accord with the evidence from the comic poets. Plutarch's quotation of Eupolis (Fr. 91 Edmonds) is similar to that of Aristophanes (*Eq.* 1375–80) and Dionysius Chalchus (Fr. 4 Diehls). His father and brother or cousin were named Erisistratus. His father who had been a general was prosecuted on a capital charge but apparently was successfully defended by Aeschines of Sphettos (Diog. Laert. 2.63). The most significant fact known about Phaeax is that his son or cousin was one of the Thirty Tyrants (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2), so that we may safely assume that, if Phaeax himself was not an oligarch, he was at least cognizant of her activities.

All these factors make the acceptance of [Andocides] 4 as a genuine historical document attractive. If we agree with Hatzfeld's interpretation that Phaeax was useful to Alcibiades because some of the ostracism votes could fall on Phaeax (and thereby lessen the danger to Alcibiades), the possible political machinations become even more complicated.<sup>22</sup> Carcopino views the problem just as subtly and thinks that Nicias encouraged the activities of Phaeax against Alcibiades.<sup>23</sup> None of these approaches, however, proves the validity of the speech, and I wish now to examine some of the factors which led Grote, Blass, Jebb, and others to reject the speech as a forgery dating in all probability from the first part of the fourth century.<sup>24</sup>

In [Andocides] 4.6 there is a minor inaccuracy when the speaker says that ostracism is only practiced in Athens. But a similar institution existed in Argos (Arist. *Pol.* 1302B18–21, Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 855) Miletus, Megara (Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 855), and Syracuse from 454 under the name *πεταλισμός* (Diod. Sic. 9.87.6). In [Andocides] 4.11 the speaker states that Alcibiades was chairman of the commission that doubled the tribute in 425,<sup>25</sup> but

<sup>22</sup> See Hatzfeld (above, note 17) 112–18. Note, however, that Hatzfeld holds that the ostracism was in 417 (p. 80).

<sup>23</sup> Carcopino (above, note 3) 230–32.

<sup>24</sup> G. Grote, *A History of Greece*, Vol. 6 (London 1849) 8; cf. Vol. 7 (1851) 144. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*<sup>2</sup>, Vol. 1 (Leipzig 1887) 336–39. R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators*, Vol. 1 (London 1876) 134–39. T. Lenschau, *RE* 19 (1938) 1534–36, s.v. "Phaiax," no. 4. G. A. Kennedy, "The Oratory of Andocides," *AJP* 79 (1958) 32. I shall not deal with stylistic objections to the authenticity of this speech; for bibliography on this point see Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.* 1.3 (Munich 1940) 137–38.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *A.T.L.* II, 40–43, (A9 = IG 1<sup>2</sup> 63).

tradition associates this action with Cleon. I do not agree with Raubitschek's view that the speaker is giving a better description of the actual events.<sup>26</sup> It is possible that Alcibiades did serve on this commission. His name would have lent support to an unpopular cause, and at the same time his service on this commission would have been an excellent opportunity for the youthful politician to gain widespread public prominence.

The most serious objection to strict historical accuracy and consequently the authenticity of [Andocides] 4 comes in Chap. 22, where Alcibiades is strongly censured for having purchased one of the Melian captives and having a son by her. Since there was hardly time for conception and delivery of a child between the fall of Melos and the beginning of ostracism proceedings, Raubitschek admits that, if the incident described in Chap. 22 is correct, the speech is spurious.<sup>27</sup> The solution offered by Raubitschek to this difficulty is that the child was not fathered by Alcibiades. The incident in question, however, is also referred to in Plutarch (*Alc.* 16.4–5), and there are no concrete grounds for rejecting it. In effect [Andocides] 4.22 itself argues against accepting 415 as the date of the ostracism.

There are other objections to the authenticity of the speech. In [Andocides] 4.3–6 the speaker attacks the institution of ostracism itself, citing in particular the fact that the "accused" was not allowed to defend himself. But what then is the purpose of the entire address? Raubitschek's solution, which may stem from Hatzfeld's suggestions about the role of Phaeax, is that the speech would have been given in a preliminary meeting of the assembly before the actual ostracism proceedings.<sup>28</sup> The speech purports to be delivered before an assembly (cf. Chaps. 7 and 25) and Raubitschek believes that "meetings of this type were obviously necessary to concentrate public opinion on those few men who were likely 'candidates' for ostracism."<sup>29</sup> The only difficulty with this position is that there is, as Raubitschek admits, no evidence for meetings of this type. The cumulative weight of

<sup>26</sup> Raubitschek (above, note 13) 197–99.

<sup>27</sup> Raubitschek (above, note 13) 200–201. He also discusses here the related accusation of the speaker of [Andocides] 4 (22) that Alcibiades was responsible for the fate of the Melians.

<sup>28</sup> Raubitschek (above, note 13) 197; cf. Hatzfeld (above, note 17) 113–16.

<sup>29</sup> But cf. Carcopino (above, note 5) 60–65.

all these discrepancies makes it highly unlikely that [Andocides] 4 offers a reliable record of the events and situation in question.<sup>30</sup>

By rejecting the implications of this speech for the dating of the ostracism of Hyperbolus, I do not wish to deny the importance of [Andocides] 4. The depiction of Alcibiades supplements our other sources and sheds additional light on the nature of criticism directed at political leaders at the end of the fifth century. It is a witness to the events under question but one whose evidence must be treated with caution. For lack of clear, definite evidence the role of Phaeax in these political maneuvers must remain a mystery, but this speech did influence the other sources and served as a basis for the interpretation given by Theophrastus and later reflected by Plutarch. The lack of clarity in the ancient sources shows that the tradition itself was confused. [Andocides] 4 may have been an attempt to provide an explanation of events which had not been widely understood when they occurred and then had been quickly blurred by rapid political developments. In my opinion, the arguments for 415, though at first sight tempting, rest on insecure evidence.

As I have shown above, a strong case for 416 can be made on the basis of *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 95 and Theopompus 96b. The selection of this date does not rule out the accounts of Plutarch. I would like to suggest that after the battle of Mantinea neither faction was strong enough to implement a unified foreign policy. As a result a tacit agreement not to disturb the *status quo* may have existed between Nicias and Alcibiades while each side gathered strength once more. Thus the threat that Hyperbolus raised in the spring of 416 was that he was drawing attention to this state of affairs before Nicias and Alcibiades were certain of their support.

To understand this situation, it is necessary to examine some of the problems posed by the failure of the Athenian Argive venture of 418. One fact that I believe has not been either sufficiently stressed or explained is the relative lack of political and military activity in the period from the battle of Mantinea to the

<sup>30</sup> Hignett (above, note 11) 395–96, in addition to noting that Hyperbolus is never mentioned in the speech, comments as follows: “Raubitschek’s arguments do not really prove more than what we knew already, that the dramatic date of [Andok.] iv is early 415, and that its author was careful not to let slip any clear indication of events subsequent to that date.” Raubitschek replied to these criticisms in “Philinos,” *Hesperia* 23 (1954) 68, note 2.

sailing of the Sicilian expedition. In comparison the political intrigues and military operations of 421–418 had been much more extensive. The relative inactivity of 418–415 is the first problem, and it can be explained by the fact that after Mantinea the foreign policies of both Nicias and Alcibiades were frustrated.

Alcibiades' policy in the Peloponnese had not achieved its ends. The resurgence of Spartan confidence was a great blow to the Peace of Nicias. The direct opposition of Athenian and Spartan troops at the battle of Mantinea was a serious matter that could have resulted in the renewal of the war. The Spartans were well aware of the dangers that Alcibiades' policies posed in 418 and responded with the magnificent army mustered at Phlius under Agis (Thuc. 5.51.3). The unsuccessful outcome of the battle destroyed the Quadruple Alliance as an effective force. The failure of the Athenian Argive venture can only have reflected badly on Alcibiades as its principal proponent. Alcibiades' election to a generalship in the following year seems almost incredible under the circumstances, and is, in itself, a remarkable testimony to his political vitality.

The events of 418 were also a severe blow to Nicias. Mantinea in effect made it even more unlikely that the terms of the Peace of Nicias would ever be carried out. The success of the Peace of Nicias, and consequently Nicias' personal political fortunes, depended on maintaining the *status quo* in hopes that the terms of the treaty would be fulfilled. This had not been the case in 418. Nicias' speech on the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.9–14) shows that his caution in the period 418–415 was based on a continuation of his policy of containment and also the realization that the empire was still not secure after such forays as those to Chalcidice and Melos.

No particular approach dominated Athenian policy from 418 to 415. Both Nicias and Alcibiades appear to have awaited developments from abroad and consolidated their domestic support. Not until 415 does the "war party" again have either a concrete goal or opportunity. It is almost as if there were a pause in Athenian policies from the late summer of 418 to the spring of 415. I believe that this comparative quiet may explain a number of the features of the ostracism of Hyperbolus.

In 415 the ambassadors from Egesta provided a chance to break the deadlock of the last three years. The Athenians were

presented with a clear choice between either continuing with the essentially passive policy of Nicias or taking this new opportunity. Alcibiades once more had an issue on which he was prepared to gamble his political fortunes. There is a strong resemblance between Alcibiades' intentions in 418 and the Sicilian policy that he so strongly advocated in 415. Although it must be admitted that the Athenian alliance with Argos was designed to capitalize on the temporary disarrangement of both Argive and Spartan politics, both this policy and the Sicilian expedition were imperialistic. Both policies, had they been successful, would have forced the eventual capitulation of Sparta and her allies. At the time of Hyperbolus' ostracism, however, such a choice as to whether or not to participate in a Sicilian venture was not available.

Eighteen months after Mantinea would have been an opportune moment for Hyperbolus to cast aspersions on both Nicias and Alcibiades because of their lack of strong leadership. With some justification he could mount the Bema and decry the lack of a unified policy and demand that the current hesitation stop. The apparent failure of the Peace of Nicias and the failure to realize its possible gains would by this time have made a deep impression, and the Spartan advances after their victory in the field can only have been a goad to the advocates of the war policy. The empire was still in a state of unrest, and few concrete results had come from the efforts to assure its loyalty. Amphipolis and Panactum were still not under Athenian control. The two most prominent figures are together in the generalship, and one of them, Alcibiades, has usurped Hyperbolus' standing with the mob. As I have explained before, ostracism of either leader would open an avenue to power for Hyperbolus. Undoubtedly Hyperbolus would have been well aware how vulnerable both Nicias and Alcibiades would have been to charges of vacillation. If the ostracism had been held in 417, then it may be interpreted as an expression of political unrest after the debacle of 418, but if it was in 416 it may be construed as an attempt to oust one of the leaders who was maintaining the *status quo*.

Ostracism, as an institution, was designed to offer the Athenian populace the opportunity to choose between policies and their proponents; but when Hyperbolus proposed an *ostrakophoria* in 416 this was not the case. Instead of a clear choice between policies, the Athenians were presented with the alternatives of

either continuing with an indefinite policy under known and tried leaders or embarking on a new and untested strategy, and the outcome of the ostracism may show that the latter was a choice that they were not prepared to make at this time.

The evidence of the comic poets and their scholiasts indicates that Hyperbolus was a person of low ethics and few scruples. That the populace even approved of reviving a constitutional practice that had not been used for a quarter of a century is a strong indication of the political tensions that underlay the apparent calm of the period. Perhaps some dissension had been manifest in the early spring of 417, but the time for campaigning had not yet arrived. In 416, however, the Athenians might perceive that still no concrete foreign policy existed and thus be much more susceptible to the idea of holding an ostracism. The failure of Alcibiades' Argive policy had placed Athens in a delicate position, and the election of Nicias and Alcibiades in 417 may have been regarded as an expedient that would provide Athens with an effective policy by combining the best features of both programs. But this result was not forthcoming. I feel that there is no difficulty in assuming the formation of a tacit "coalition" between Nicias and Alcibiades before the actions of Hyperbolus made it a virtual necessity (see above, note 19). The events of 418 made a stalemate in Athenian politics almost inevitable, and this factor would account for the lack of a single aggressive policy. Only two results, and neither very important, were forthcoming in 417; Nicias' expedition to the Chalcidice which was frustrated by the actions of Perdiccas, and the blockade of Macedonia (Thuc. 5.83.4).

Plutarch (*Nic.* 11.4) states that collusion was necessary to effect the removal of Hyperbolus. This union indicates one political fact: in 416 neither Nicias nor Alcibiades was strong enough to do the job alone. Precisely in what way these two leaders succeeded in turning Hyperbolus' plan against himself is not known.<sup>31</sup> Carcopino and Hatzfeld both note that in the

<sup>31</sup> Shear (above, note 3) 246 states, "the fact that the name is neatly printed on the sherd is evidence that the ballots had been prepared in advance for distribution at the polls." This is hardly conclusive: see O. Broneer's comments on the hoard of Themistocles ostraka, "Excavations on the North Slope of the Acropolis, 1937," *Hesperia* 7 (1938) 228-43. We know of one play, Plato's *Συμμαχία*, that may refer to the league of Nicias and Alcibiades against Hyperbolus. One fragment, 153 Edmonds, is of particular interest on this point. It is taken from Hermias' commen-

league against Hyperbolus we can see how the old constitutional safeguard was unable to resist the political pressures that could be exerted by the clubs, and that it was the recognition of this factor that led to the abandonment of ostracism.<sup>32</sup> If this is so, the league of Nicias and Alcibiades gains an added significance as one of the first times, if not the first, that this new political force was felt.<sup>33</sup> The silent workings of the clubs and factions would have been very effective in the undebated ostracism proceedings, and it is interesting to note that this is one of the principal fears felt by the speaker of [Andocides] 4 (4).

In 416 Hyperbolus by proposing ostracism was indicating, for his own ends, disapproval of Nicias' and Alcibiades' temporary acceptance of the *status quo*. In 416 neither Nicias nor Alcibiades alone, without at least the tacit cooperation of the other, was strong enough to implement his own policies, but both recognized that if Hyperbolus was successful this incipient Cleon would pose a greater threat to either of them than either one to the other. Combined action quashed this threat and allowed the *status quo* to continue, but the tempo of Athenian policy picked up once more, perhaps in an effort to discredit the charges Hyperbolus could have made about inactivity. Alcibiades went to Argos twice in the coming year to aid the democrats. The Melian expedition, which was part of the program to consolidate the empire, began, and finally, a little more than a year later, the Sicilian expedition departed.

tary on the *Phaedrus* (ad 241b p. 90 Ast=p. 314 Bekk.) where he describes a children's game called *δοσπρακίνδα*, "sherds." Eustathius (1161.37) states that this term was often used by the comic poets as a veiled reference to ostracism. As an example he cites the same fragment of the comic poet Plato which may then be understood as referring to the unpredictable element in ostracism proceedings. The quotation of Plato (fr. 187 Edmonds), cited twice in Plutarch, which describes the infamy of Hyperbolus' ostracism may very well come from the *Συμμοχία*.

<sup>32</sup> Carcopino (above, note 5) 236-39 and 249, and Hatzfeld (above, note 17) 112-16.

<sup>33</sup> There is another characteristic feature of ostracism that has not been sufficiently stressed in this connection. D. Kagan, "The Origin and Purpose of Ostracism," *Hesperia* 30 (1961) 393-401, describes how ostracism was a measure by which the faction in power exercised its control: I believe that Kagan is correct in stating that, when Hyperbolus showed how this use of the institution could be subverted, this was one of the factors that led to the abandonment of the practice.